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infrastructure that any society has to offer, and this breaks down once the interracial 
differences – the average differences between groups – go beyond a critical level. What 
this threshold is varies from society to society – but the fact that it exists cannot be denied.” 
 - Kanbur, 1998: 26 
 
1.  Introduction 
The analyses contained in the previous papers in this research project indicate that poverty is still endemic in 
South Africa, that it has a strong racial dimension, and that it has its origins largely in the labour market. 
Despite the continuing relevance of race for identifying the poor, the analysis has also shown that labour 
market discrimination has declined as a factor in the generation of poverty and inequality. What appears to 
contribute more are other factors also correlated with race, such as differentials in education, location 
(urban/rural), family size and composition. Moreover, as will be argued below, if cognisance is taken of large 
differentials in educational quality not considered in earnings functions, the residual role for labour market 
race discrimination in explaining earnings differentials may well be small. Thus there is an urgent need to 
identify those factors that are amenable to policy intervention, in order to reduce poverty and inequality. 
Unlike in countries with low poverty rates, where transient poverty is relatively large, i.e. movement in and 
out of poverty is relatively large compared to the stock of poverty at any moment in time (cf. Van den Bosch 
at al., 1997: 107), it is likely that endemic poverty is more the norm in a country such as South Africa, with 
high levels of poverty and structural unemployment. There is no panel data available to support this 
conclusion, however. Endemic poverty combined with high expectations and high levels of inequality, 
particularly racial inequality, are likely to be bad for stability and therefore undermine prospects of growth. As 
Kanbur (1998: 26) remarks, “The core literature on Income Distribution and Development is strangely silent 
on inter-racial or inter-ethnic dimensions of distribution as development process, while the daily political 
discourse in many countries, particularly in Africa, has this as a constant topic of discussion and tension.” This 
racial dimension to poverty and inequality enhances the urgency of policies to reduce poverty. 
When one considers the pattern of inequality and even many other aspects of South African economic 
life, the similarities with Latin America are striking. Latin America shares with South Africa its middle-income 
developing country status as well as high levels of inequality. For this reason it is useful to draw on a recent 
analysis about inequality in Latin America by the Inter-American Development Bank (hereafter IADB) (1999):  
• Latin American (as indeed also South African) inequality is associated with large wage differentials. “In 
other words, it results not only from differences between owners of capital and workers, but from a 
divergence of incomes among workers.” (IADB, 1999: 1)  
• “(M)uch of Latin America’s inequality relates to the difference between the top 10 percent of the 
population and the rest.” (IADB, 1999: 1), as is indeed also the case for South Africa. Thus, while the 
richest decile have a per capita income 60% higher than that of the second richest decile in the US, and 
160% higher in Latin America, it is 208% higher in South Africa1.  
• As in Latin America, it will be shown below that indeed in South Africa also “much of this gap between 
the top 10 percent and the rest reflect the … slow and unequal progress in improving the level and quality 
of schooling.” (IADB, 1999: 2), and in particular high returns to and unequal access to higher education 
                                                                 
1 The South African data is based on expenditures, not income, and the situation with regard to incomes may 
even show greater inequality. 








(IADB, 1999: 5). Indeed, as in Latin America, primary education is virtually universal in South Africa, while 
the challenge at this stage remains “to improve the quality of primary education and to universalize 
secondary education.” (IADB, 1999: 5) 
• In Latin America, “(f)amilies play many roles in the complex relationships that sustain income inequality. 
They mitigate the effects of high inequality by sharing resources, often across generations. They also play 
a role in determining how many of their members should try to find work, how many children to have, 
and how much education to give them.” (IADB, 1999: 2) This is also true in South Africa where, in 
addition, migration and urban-rural remittances play a particularly important role in mitigating inequality 
(although the separation of migrants and their families of origin into separate households may accentuate 
measured inter-household inequality). Furthermore, family formation is strongly influenced by the 
pervasiveness of unemployment, leading to many young males attaching themselves to older households 
until a fairly high age (Simkins, 1998), and the presence of old-age pensions as an important source of 
income in rural areas also influences family structures, through retaining older members within the 
household (Case & Deaton, 1998).2 
• The demographic transition presently offers both Latin America and South Africa some respite: Fertility 
decline and ageing are having opposite effects on dependency ratios, but the effect of fertility decline still 
dominates, thus reducing child dependency burdens and labour force growth rates. In South Africa, in 
contrast, fertility decline started somewhat later and fertility is still higher than in Latin America, so the 
benefits of this effect on child dependency burdens are somewhat less strong and the rate of labour force 
growth higher than in Latin America. 
• As in Latin America, the capital market largely bypasses the poor and even large segments of the middle-
income group in South Africa. This not only excludes them from the economic mainstream, but reduces 
overall growth opportunities by wasting potential entrepreneurial resources.  
• As in Latin America, the scope for more progressive taxation is severely limited and a widening of the tax 
base plus progressive spending offers better possibilities for improving equity. But as the IADB Report 
(1999: 4) points out, economic instability is strongly related to inequality, and such inequality makes fiscal 
prudence politically much more difficult.  
• Whereas Latin America has improved its macro-economic performance in recent years, there is still 
greater uncertainty whether South Africa’s growth rates are likely to be adequate to outpace population 
growth. 
 
Thus there is much to learn by South Africa from the experience of and analysis of Latin American 
countries. In Latin America, there is some grounds for optimism:  
“Although it may be little solace for those riding in the last cars of the development train, most of 
Latin America appears to be turning the corner; as these trends continue, they should provide a 
basis to reduce income inequality in the future, as long as the adequate economic and social 
policies are in place.” (IADB, 1999: 3)  
This conclusion as to prospects for reduced inequality in Latin America may equally apply to South Africa, 
but for the fact that economic growth is far less entrenched yet in the latter. Adequate and sustained growth is 
required to ensure that the distributional conflict in South Africa does not remain a zero sum game that may 
tear at the fabric of social stability. Broadly speaking, two routes for reduced poverty suggest themselves. The 
                                                                 
2 Kanbur (1998: 14) remarks, in discussing Chen’s conclusion that the pattern of household formation is the 
major factor explaining increasing household inequality in the 1980s and 1990s in Taiwan, that this factor is 
“missing from nearly all studies in the ‘Kuznetsian’ tradition” (Kanbur, 1998: 14). In South Africa, too, this is still 
a far too neglected field. 
 







one is to reduce inequity through various interventions, including those targeting mainly the poor. The 
alternative route is concerned with an acceleration of growth. It is widely agreed in the development literature 
today that such growth contributes most to the reduction of poverty if it is strongly associated with utilising 
the major assets of the poor, particularly their labour (De Haan et al., 1997). Growth can strongly impact 
directly on poverty, even without improved distribution, but may also allow distribution to take place without 
engendering increased conflict. The macroeconomic conditions for growth fall outside the ambit of this 
research project, but we shall return to growth as a factor in poverty reduction when we consider the growth 
effects of human capital provision. 
Based on the work in this project, as well as the international literature, there are a number of more 
promising avenues for improving equity and targeting the poor. In the South African circumstances, the most 
promising routes appear to be: 
• Social transfers to the poor, which already contribute in a major way to reducing poverty in South Africa 
(Ardington & Lund, 1995; Van der Berg, 1997; Case & Deaton, 1998) 
• Expanding and improving the educational system to reduce earnings differentials, improve access of the 
poor to available job opportunities, and accelerate growth. Training, both on and off the job, would 
naturally also contribute in this regard. 
• Improving access for the poor to other social services (health, housing and social infrastructure). Though 
this would not necessarily improve their income, it may improve other aspects of their life, e.g. through 
improved sanitation, access to water, health services, nutrition, and housing. As this research project 
focuses on money-metric aspects of poverty (income poverty), however, we shall not discuss policy 
options in this field. 
• Improving access to financial services, particularly credit facilities, to the poor. This is a highly technical 
issue about which present household surveys can tell very little, and consequently it will not be discussed 
any further. This does not, however, detract from its importance for the poor and for broad-based 
economic growth. 
Thus the next two sections will focus on the two areas of social policy directly relevant to improving the 
incomes of the poor, i.e. education and social transfers (safety nets). 
 
2.  Education 
Education’s role in reducing poverty is of paramount importance, because of its contribution to improving the 
earnings potential of the poor, both in competition for jobs and earnings in a static labour market, and as a 
source of growth and employment in itself. As Kanbur (1998: 20) puts it, “The distribution of physical and 
human capital emerges from the theoretical and empirical literature as the key to distributional consequences 
of growth, and as the determinant of growth itself.” For this reason, we shall investigate the possible impact of 
education in terms of both its distributional consequences and its potential impact on economic growth. 
Thereafter, we shall briefly discuss possible educational policy consequences of the economic debates on the 
role of education. 
 
2.1 Education, inequality and poverty 
Other research in this project has shown that education is crucial in determining labour force participation, 
employment, and earnings. This is similar to the results found in other similar societies. Ferreira & Litchfield 
(1998: 32), for instance, report that between one-quarter and one-third of income differentials between 
households in Chile can be ascribed to differences in the educational attainment of the household head, a far 
greater proportion than captured by any other characteristic of the household.  









Inequality of education has long been a determining factor in earnings distribution in South Africa. In the 
past decades, there has been a substantial reduction in schooling inequality as reflected in the years of 
educational output (unadjusted for the quality of education). For instance, working on the same data set as 
most of the studies in this report, Lam (1999) shows the decline in inequality in years of education completed 
between two birth cohorts separated by 30 years, shown in Table 1. Note that not only mean-invariant 
measures such as the coefficient of variation have declined, but also the variance. This is important, for if 
earnings were log-linearly related to years of education, an increased variance could well be associated with 
increased earnings inequality even if the coefficient of variation declined, as Lam (1999) argues indeed 
occurred in Brazil.3 In SA, schooling variance declined even amongst blacks. Between the different races, 
schooling inequality greatly declined, as shown by Fig. 1, which shows the mean years of schooling by birth 
cohort. Africans in the cohort born in 1920 had a mean backlog of 8.0 years of education compared to 
whites; those born in 1950 still a 6.0 year backlog, the 1960 cohort a 4.6 year backlog, and the 1970s cohort 
a backlog that had been reduced to only 3.2 years. 
Interestingly, Lam’s results comparing educational inequality between Brazil and South Africa are 
supported by the work of Filmer and Pritchett (1998), who find that Latin American educational inequality is 
still large, even more so than in many countries of Southern and Eastern Africa (though they did not include 
South Africa in their sample). Londoño (1996) confirms that Latin American educational performance, in 
terms of years of education completed, lags far behind most other countries at this level of economic 
development. 
 
Table 1: Educational inequality for two SA cohorts, 1995  
 Cohorts 55-59 Cohorts 25-29 
Mean 5.77 9.05 
Standard deviation 4.51 3.60 
Coefficient of variation 0.78 0.40 
Gini 0.44 0.21 
Source: Lam, 1999: Table 2 
 
Moll (1998) shows convincingly that South African earnings inequality between race groups has been 
decreasing between 1981 and 1993, whilst inequality in earnings within race groups has been increasing. 
Thus the net result was to leave overall earnings inequality largely unchanged, as Table 2 shows. It is likely that 
changes in education played only a minor role in the shifts in earnings. Moll argues that the growing earnings 
inequality within race groups was rather caused by the removal of labour market discrimination in the past 
decades, which allowed more wage mobility within race groups, with some blacks better positioned than 
others to benefit from the new opportunities for upward mobility, while more poorly educated whites in 
particular lost the protection they had historically enjoyed in the form of barriers to black job advancement. 
                                                                 
3 If logarithm of earnings of worker i is  
log yi = α + βSi + ui 
(yi is earnings, Si schooling, ui residual uncorrelated with schooling), then  
V(log yi ) = β2 V(Si) + V(ui) 
Thus earnings inequality (log variance) is a linear function of variance in schooling.  
 
If schooling inequality is measured by the coefficient of variation CV = σ/µ (standard deviation divided by mean), 
which is mean-invariant, then greater earnings inequality is possible despite reduced schooling inequality. Lam 
(1999) shows that the standard deviation for schooling rose less than the mean for Brazilian cohorts born 1925 
to 1950, thus the coefficient of variation declined. But lower schooling inequality did not also reduce high 
earnings inequality, as variance of schooling rose.  







But even in this case, education is important, in that it determines who can and who cannot benefit from the 
new opportunities for blacks in the labour market. 
 
Table 2: Inequality of monthly earnings by race, 1980 & 1993 
 1980 1993 
Gini coefficient 0.52 0.51 
Coefficient of variation 1.19 1.12 
L-statistic * 0.49 0.50 
L-statistic: Blacks 0.14 0.28 
L-statistic: Indians 0.21 0.28 
L-statistic: Coloureds 0.25 0.35 
L-statistic: Whites 0.21 0.28 
Within-group inequality 0.17 0.29 
Between group inequality 0.32 0.21 
* The L-statistic (mean logarithmic deviation) is an additively decomposable measure of inequality that ranges from 0 (complete 
equality) to infinity. If utility has a logarithmic form, L measures the difference between maximum social welfare with a given income 
(the ideal state of distribution) and the actual social welfare (Moll, 1998: 4). It is calculated as the mean of the natural logarithms of 
earnings, minus the natural logarithm of mean earnings.  
Source: Mol, 1998: Tables 1 & 2  
 
When working with South African educational data, however, it is important to consider that the quality of 
education still varies considerably. In this respect, too, the similarities with Latin America are great, for there 
too "the poor receive an inferior quality of schooling” (IADB, 1998: 53).To some extent, the old dividing lines 
of race have blurred in South Africa: large numbers of black pupils are now attending schools formerly serving 
whites only, while there is also growing diversity in the quality of schools serving mainly black pupils. 
Nevertheless, there are still considerable differentials in the ability of schools to have their pupils pass 
matriculation, with most formerly African schools performing much more poorly than white schools. Very high 
matriculation failure rates (more than half of matriculants failed in 1998, and only 13 per cent received 
university exemption (Edusource, 1999: 5) despite high repetition rates also indicate that pass rates at lower 
standards are still perhaps artificially high, thus educational attainment figures below the matriculation level for 
Africans in particular may be inflated relative to the cognitive education levels they have mastered. 
 But the quality differentials go beyond only the ability to get pupils to pass matriculation. It also lies in the 
quality of the matriculation itself, in terms of the standard at which matric is passed, as well as the subject 
choice. It is a source of much concern in South Africa, for instance, that few schools serving mainly Africans 
perform adequately in terms of providing good background in Mathematics or Science. So, for instance, only 
45% of matriculation candidates wrote mathematics in 1997 (with a marked male bias); only 21% passed it. 
For Science these percentages were even lower, at 25% and 16% respectively. Moreover, a large proportion 
of those who wrote Mathematics did so at the lower grade, a standard far below what is conventional in 
developed countries. Only 50% and 42% of teachers teaching Mathematics and Science have studied these 
subjects beyond secondary school level. In the Western Cape, the province with the best matriculation 
results, only 24% of matriculation candidates attempted Mathematics at the higher grade, and only 20% 
passed it.  








Another indication of the inequality in educational output can be gleaned from some data for the Western 
Cape. As pass rates are almost uniformly high, differentials between schools (inequality) in terms of pass rates 
is relatively low, as Table 3 shows. However, as soon as more advanced levels of school performance are 
evaluated (percentage A-candidates, or percentage exemptions), inequality increases considerably, with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.56 and 0.80 respectively. 
 
Table 3: Inequality of educational outcomes between schools in the Western Cape, 1997 
% A-aggregate % Exemption % Pass 
Mean 2.6% 23.0% 80.6% 
Standard deviation 5.0% 22.0% 22.5% 
Coefficient of variation 1.94 0.96 0.28 
Gini coefficient 0.80 0.56 0.15 
Source: Own calculations from Western Cape Education Department data 
 
The differentials in quality of education provided are also well illustrated by Fig. 2, which shows, for African 
and whites aged 13 to 18, literacy and numeracy test scores for 1993 on an 8 point scale, where questions 
have been set at approximately Grade 7 (age 12) level. Not even the performance of whites is very 
encouraging, but what is particularly alarming is that Africans do far worse than whites on both these tests. 
This has to be seen against the fact that educational levels attained by Africans and whites at age 13 differ 
relatively little. The poorer African attainment at higher age levels can thus perhaps be seen as the delayed 
effect of lower cognitive achievement levels on progression through high school and on matriculation pass 
rates. Figure 3 shows that though Africans aged 13 to 18 in 1995 had attained between 78% and 86% of 
white levels of years of education, their 1993 performance in terms of literacy scores ranged only between 
50% and 63% of white levels, and their numeracy scores lagged even further behind at 36% to 47% of white 
levels. Indeed, at the cross-country level, “…school children from higher income countries tend to achieve 
higher test scores, holding fixed other factors that influence student achievement.” (Lee & Barro, 1997: 23). 
Whether this is the effect of non-school factors operating (home environment, or education of parents), or of 
qualitative differences in school productivity between rich and poor countries is not clear, but in South Africa 
test score differentials by race are so large that it is likely that school and teacher quality play a determining 
role.  
Case and Deaton (1999, Table 8) show that factors associated with higher test scores for Africans on both 
literacy and numeracy include the age of respondents, years of education completed (standardising for age), 
and education of the head of the household. Keeping all other factors constant, their regression coefficients 
suggest that almost ten years of additional education would be required to bring African cognitive levels in 
terms of both literacy and numeracy up to the same standard of that of whites (“four additional years 
generate one additional correct answer on the tests”(Case & Deaton, 1999: 26)). This may be an 
exaggeration, but does show that the former African school system is completely inadequate to integrate 
large numbers of people into the modern economy. This must be the yardstick by which, from an economic 
viewpoint, the efficacy of the educational system must be measured.  
Considering these quality differentials, some of the racial differentials in wages for persons with the same 
education and experience may in fact be the result not of labour market discrimination, but of pre-labour 
market discrimination in the quality of schooling. In some Latin American countries, where private education 
is important to improve educational quality, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 1998: 54-5) found 
significant differentials in the labour market earnings for individuals from different income with similar 
education and earnings, which they ascribe to differential quality of education. “Estimates show that 
individuals from the lower deciles receive a primary education whose quality (measured in terms of income 
generation capacity) is 35 percent lower than that of the next decile above.” (IADB, 1998: 54)    







Not surprisingly, there is also increasing inequality developing within the African population as far as 
educational attainment is concerned. This largely follows the lines of income: more affluent families are better 
able to support their children through school, so that there is increasing stratification taking place within 
African society. Fig. 4 shows that children from the top two deciles among Africans do considerably better 
than their poorer counterparts and only at age 15 start falling behind whites. Case & Deaton (1999: 21) 
conclude that private resources (expenditures) were indeed a major factor in determining South African 
educational outcomes under apartheid. “Pupils in better-off Black households do better in their education, and 
we find no parallel for Whites. That the education of Blacks but not Whites is constrained by financial 
resources is further supported by the fact that many Blacks who are not in school (but not Whites) – report 
lack of resources as the reason.” (Case & Deaton, 1999: 28) Furthermore, newly acquired access to better 
quality schools for the more affluent is likely to have accentuated qualitative educational differentials amongst 
Africans.  
In the labour market, educational differentials in association with the demand for labour determine returns 
to education. Thus far, little is known about past patterns of returns to education and their evolution over time 
in South Africa, not even to speak about what these would have been in the absence of apartheid-based 
labour market interventions. Thus it is extremely difficult to predict with any confidence what would happen 
to labour market inequality given future educational outcomes and patterns of economic growth and 
development. International patterns of development point, however, to growing demand for skills (see for 
instance Goldin & Katz, 1999 on returns to skills in the USA) since the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
without a large spurt in the availability of such skills, educational premia are likely to remain high. Thus the 
reduction of labour market inequality requires a substantial improvement in the supply of skills through an 
improvement in both the quantity and quality of education. Returns to education for the USA for all of the 
twentieth century (Goldin & Katz, 1999) found that only an enormous expansion in secondary schooling after 
1910 made possible a reduction in the returns to education until the 1950s, since which time returns to 
education again rose as skills demand outstripped their supply. “Skill-biased technological change” (Goldin & 
Katz, 1999: 25) was a major factor in the US (as has also been shown for recent decades by Murphy & 
Welch, 1994), as it is likely to be also in South Africa.  
 
2.2 Education and growth 
The new growth literature has again brought to the fore the importance of human capital and technology for 
economic growth. The neo-classical growth model of Solow pointed to unconditional convergence of per 
capita incomes, for two major reasons.  
• Firstly, capital accumulation would shift to less developed countries once diminishing returns to capital 
make further investment in developed countries unattractive.  
• Secondly, if technology is a public good freely available to all, developing countries should enjoy the 
“benefit of coming late”, which would allow them to grow more rapidly than more developed countries 
by utilising existing technologies, without having to bear the cost of developing them (Fagerberg, 1994). 
Given these assumptions, catch up and convergence should in principle have taken place. That this did 
not occur and that an increasing gap arose instead between the “convergence club” - countries able to share 
in international capital movements and technology and indeed converging on the world leader - and the 
majority of the developing world (Baumol et al., 1989), called for an alternative view of the growth process. 
The theoretical underpinnings for this came to the fore with the new growth literature and the concept of 
endogenous growth:  
• One common feature of many endogenous growth models is in their modelling of technology as 
something whose benefits are to some extent appropriable. This allows for a different view of the role 








and the development of technology, for only if they can appropriate (some of) the benefits would firms 
find it attractive to invest in technological research and development.  
• A second common feature of the new growth literature is a new role for human capital as separate from 
labour or physical capital in the production process.  
The new growth literature again spawned a further array of empirical studies attempting to isolate the 
crucial variables in international growth. Such attempts based on cross sectional data for both developed and 
developing countries, whether based on a theoretical model or only empirical observations, have been 
relatively unsuccessful, inter alia because the quality of the data which they use are highly suspect, and the 
human capital and technology variables very difficult to specify or to measure. Thus it is not surprising that 
Levine & Renelt’s (1992) finding still largely applies, that international growth regressions have been unable to 
convincingly identify any other contributor to long term growth but capital accumulation. 
Despite the failure to prove the role of human capital in long term economic growth, most economists 
agree that the reason for this lies mainly in data deficiencies and variable specification, rather than in the 
absence of such a relationship flowing from human capital to growth. (There is also no doubting the flow of 
reverse causality as well, which complicates empirical analysis.) Three forms of education-growth relationships 
have been variously tested, being consistent with a priori views of informed observers in this field: 
• That improvements in education and in economic performance (growth) go together (which accentuates 
the difficulty of determining the direction of causality); 
• That educational improvement is a condition for higher growth, so that high initial levels of education lead 
to high rates of economic growth, all other things being constant;  
• That the distribution of education is crucial, in a similar way as others have pointed to the initial 
distribution of other productive assets (land or capital) as contributor to accelerated growth.  
A more general explanation is also possible, viz. that human capital is part of what has been termed “social 
capability”, a crucial ingredient that determines whether countries are able to attract international investment 
or utilise available technology so as to reduce the gap between themselves and developed countries 
(Abromovitz, 1989). Social capability obviously incorporates more than only human capital (e.g. institutions, 
governance, etc.), but clearly human capital is a component. 
Irrespective of one’s view on the relationship between education and growth, the problem in taking 
further the work in this field appears to remain the paucity of dependable data where the human capital 
variable can be specified in a form that accords with the theoretical point of departure. Much of the work has 
taken school enrolment (usually gross enrolment) as proxy for human capital, which it is not; almost all have 
had to ignore possible differentials in the quality of education; studies differ in whether they use data on 
primary, secondary or tertiary education, or combinations thereof.  
So, for instance, Barro (1999: 15 & Table 1) finds that economic “(g)rowth is positively related to the stock 
of human capital at the start of each period, as measured by the average years of attainment at the secondary 
and higher levels of adult males. (Growth turns out to be insignificantly related to secondary and higher 
attainment of females and to primary attainment of males and females.)” However, though schooling appears 
to affect growth rates, it does not impact significantly on investment (Barro, 1999: 16 & Table 2). If these 
results are robust, the implication must be that education’s effect works through productivity improvement 
rather than through attracting more investment in physical capital. This is a finding that is crucial for South 
Africa with its history of poor, but improving, multifactor productivity – but the data deficiencies warn against 
too strong weight given to these results. Only lately have some (e.g. Lee & Barro, 1998) painstakingly started 
collecting the data which would be necessary for moving beyond the present empirical impasse that research 
in this field has reached. 
 







2.3 Education policy 
Four broad issues of economic policy arise in the educational area, viz. the question of the fiscal costs of 
education in aggregate, allocation of resources within education, the productivity of educational resource use, 
and the economic requirements in terms of education. This last issue has been dealt with to some extent in 
the previous section; national resources for education and the allocation of resources within education have 
been treated in detail in an excellent recent government report (South Africa, 1998a), so they will only receive 
perfunctory treatment here. That leaves the question of educational productivity as the major policy issue to 
be discussed here. 
 
South Africa allocates, by international standards, a large share of its national resources to public 
education; its public education spending ratio at about 7 per cent of GDP is close to the highest in the world. 
Moreover, education spending has increased relatively rapidly. Shifting further fiscal resources to education 
does not appear to be a viable proposition. Moreover, larger financial flows to education in the past five years 
did not in fact increase real resources for education: the impact of the fiscal resource shift was overshadowed 
by wage increases for teachers, with the result that the total full time equivalent number of teachers employed 
may even have marginally declined, while pupil numbers continued to rise. Cutbacks in educational personnel 
in some of the richer provinces could therefore not be matched by increases in personnel in the educationally 
worse endowed provinces. Internationally, the development process appears to give rise to the relative 
burden of teacher salaries falling (i.e. relative to per capita GDP): 
“…from 1960 to 1990, the real average salary per primary school teacher increased from $10 428 to 
$26 820 in the OECD and from $4 869 to $7 179 in developing countries. The rising trend applies 
to all developing countries… In contrast, the figures for the CPEs have fallen markedly from $14 462 
in 1965 to $4 771 in 1990. The ratios of estimated real salaries of primary school teachers to per 
capita GDP have typically declined over time; from 1965 to 1990, the value dropped from 2.5 to 
2.2 in the OECD, from 4.9 to 3.6 in the overall group of developing countries, and from 7.4 to 1.7 
in the CPEs. These ratios tend to be higher in developing countries, especially in Sub Saharan Africa 
(5.1 in 1990) than in the OECD.” (Lee & Barro, 1997: 17/18) (All figures in 1985 PPP-dollars.) 
In South Africa, in contrast, teacher salaries outpaced the growth of national resources. One reason for this 
was the strong bargaining power of the teacher unions that has allowed them to raise their salaries far more 
than inflation. Furthermore, black teachers felt themselves left behind when black advancement in the public 
sector accelerated after democratisation, as there were few opportunities for promotion within the teaching 
sector that they could benefit from (De Villiers (1996: 288-9) reports that more than 90 per cent of teachers 
will not receive more than one promotion in a lifetime of teaching), thus their frustrations were vented in the 
wage bargaining process. Thus after democratisation, when the need for resource shifts across the formerly 
racially-based departments was crucial, resources increasingly had to be directed to personnel spending, 
leaving a growing dearth of non-personnel spending. Thus from 1995/6 to 1997/8, personnel expenditure in 
real terms increased by 20%, while non-personnel expenditure declined by 17% (South Africa, 1998a: 27).  
As the growth in pupil numbers still exceeds the growth rate of the economy, the government team 
investigating the medium term expenditure framework (South Africa, 1998a) last year came to the conclusion 
that there is likely to be a major funding problem in education in coming years, unless  
• more funds are allocated to education, which they regard as fiscally infeasible, and which internationally 
has been shown not always to improve educational outcomes (Gupta et al., 1999: 4);  
• pupil-teacher ratios rise even further, which is unacceptable to government, teacher unions and parents;  
• teacher salaries decline in real terms, which is strongly opposed by the teacher unions; 
• some combination of the above occurs. 








From an economic efficiency point of view, it can be argued that the malaise of the South African 
educational system lies less in terms of allocative inefficiency than in x-inefficiency. Reallocating resources 
from one level of education to another, as many suggest for developing countries (Gupta et al., 1999), would 
bring little gain in South Africa, and it is not even clear which level of education most requires additional 
resources, as will presently be discussed. There is perhaps a stronger case for shifting more financial resources 
to non-personnel teaching resources; personnel spending is so dominant that even a small shift of this nature 
would have a major impact on the availability of classroom resources.  
However, the clearest problem is one of utilising existing resources better, even in their present 
application. The major inefficiency in qualitative terms lies in what used to be the African school system, by far 
the largest part of the system, where the quality of learning in schools is often abysmal. Strong words from the 
President and the Minister of Education in recent months show that they blame this in part on a lack of 
discipline within schools, and in particular amongst teachers.  
This is the result of a typical principal-agent problem. Outputs of the educational system are extremely 
difficult to monitor, as is teacher effort (input), thus low teacher productivity is difficult to overcome. The 
educational authorities have responded to this problem by attempting to shift the monitoring to the parent 
community as the final “principal”. Unfortunately, however, this policy has had limited success in those 
schools where the parents themselves have had little education and therefore do not feel confident about 
their ability to assess the contribution of teachers. Moreover, lines of authority are also not always clear and 
school principals often find it difficult to act against undisciplined teachers or pupils.  
Thus there is still a large effort required to restore the “culture of learning” to South African schools. The 
expenditure review team notes that the COLTS (Culture of Learning, Teaching, and Service) campaign 
launched in 1996 “was the first more or less official recognition of the fact that efficiency and work effort 
problems, rather than funding by itself, were at the heart of the problems in the education sector” (South 
Africa, 1998a: 35). The effect of the culture of learning on educational performance manifests itself 
completely differently in the case of East Asia, which appears to be outperforming other educational systems: 
“…a major component of East Asia’s academic performance is left unexplained by the family and school 
inputs that were included in the regressions.” (Lee & Barro, 1997: 25) “The significance of the East Asian 
dummy may reflect the existence of an ‘Asian value”, which is broadly defined by the cultural and religious 
features unique to the East Asian countries.” (p.25) Thus culture and history play a strong role in education, 
and South Africa is presently poorly placed to benefit from this.  
One avenue to improve the situation, as always where there is a principal-agent problem, is the provision 
of more information. There is a paucity of information for the education authorities to analyse the educational 
situation and their policy options. Presently, they have only one measure of educational output available to 
them, and that is matriculation results, but these still do not identify the roots of the problem. It has been 
shown in Section 2.1 above that as early as age 13, literacy and numeracy levels amongst Africans are already 
far below par. Allocating resources based on matriculation results cannot adequately address a problem 
which requires far earlier intervention. Thus the question of whether resources should go to secondary or to 
primary level, even if matriculation pass rates were the criterion, cannot be properly answered without more 
data on the qualitative performance of different parts of the school system. This requires a large scale and 
continued effort at measuring cognitive achievement at different levels within the educational system, in order 
to better understand the relationship between home background of pupils, educational inputs, and 
enhancement of cognitive achievement. Moreover, identifying the poor performing schools in order to take 
remedial action requires a better understanding of how schools perform, and what are the causes behind it.  
Thus the returns-to-education literature, useful as it is, cannot assist South Africa all that much in resource 
allocation across different levels of the educational system: 
• It is not clear that more resources are the solution to problems of expansion of outputs. In fact, access to 
education is no longer a major problem, as is clear from Fig.5, which shows that more than 90% of 
children of all race groups remain at school until attaining matric or reaching at least the age of 16, and 







that among Africans it is common to remain in the school system much longer, due to poor progression 
rates, amongst other factors. 
• The quality of the output varies considerably amongst schools and over time, so that the educational 
returns literature is always suspect. 
• The needs of the economy in terms of the type rather than the level of educational output should also be 
considered, and may affect the returns to education (e.g. the importance of the choice of Mathematics as 
school subject for further training); 
• Returns to education are the result of the interaction between the supply and demand for human capital, 
and the latter is related to the growth path of the economy, which is itself changing. Moreover, insofar as 
growth itself may be determined by the availability of appropriate levels of education, there is an 
endogeneity problem that cannot be solved. 
 
3. Social security4 
3.1 Background to South African social security 
South African social security system is surprisingly developed for a middle income developing country, as is 
evident from both coverage against contingencies and social security spending ratios (Van der Merwe, 1996: 
296 & 318), a fact that can perhaps be ascribed to the way that the system developed under apartheid as a 
welfare state for whites and expanded under social and political pressure to incorporate other groups (Van 
der Berg, 1997). If one allows for the fact that South African occupational insurance is really a form of social 
insurance that does not flow through the budget, social security expenditure ratios have reached levels only 
attained by Western European welfare states in the post-Second World War period (cf. Alber, 1982: 64, Table 
4). In a country known for its racial inequalities and discriminatory social policies that were poorly targeted at 
the poor, it appears puzzling that social security is so advanced .  
Access to modern employment has become a major dividing line within the population, with all insiders 
increasingly sharing in the privileged situation previously reserved for whites, and unemployed outsiders, 
through lack of skills, geographic location and marginalisation in wider society, becoming further 
impoverished. An intermediate group, though formally employed (often in agriculture, domestic service or 
mining, and including many women in the first two categories), is only tenuously linked to employment and to 
the modern consumer society because of their low wages, uncertain jobs, or status as migrant workers. As in 
other developing countries, the large part of the labour force lacking formal employment cannot be reached 
by social insurance, and as will be shown, not all the employed are covered by social insurance. Yet there 
exists today a well developed social assistance system that, although fiscally expensive (it costs more than 2 
per cent of GDP) , reaches many of the poor.  
In apartheid South Africa, an embryonic welfare state was erected to protect whites against various 
contingencies. The expansion of this system to other groups ironically puts South Africa in the rather unique 
situation for a semi-industrial country of having the trappings of a modern welfare state. South African social 
security today has two main components: 
• Occupational (social) insurance, which includes: retirement benefits for a substantial proportion of the 
formally employed labour force; a somewhat inadequate system of workers compensation against 
injuries sustained at work; a system of unemployment insurance which cannot address the major 
                                                                 
4 This part of this report is largely based on previous work of the author, particularly that published as Van der Berg 1997. 
 








unemployment risks associated with structural rather than cyclical unemployment; and health insurance 
for the better skilled5; and 
• Social assistance , with three main pillars: Social old age pensions, disability grants and child and family 
grants, all means tested to ensure targeting at the poorest. 
An interesting dimension of the development of South African social security was the tension between the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire position, sceptical of social security, and continental European influences, 
more supportive of it (Kruger, 1992: 117; Van der Merwe, 1996: 381). The latter were dominant in the old 
Boer Republics and in the pre-British Cape Colony, and again came to the fore under Afrikaner nationalist 
rule, but then with a racial bias; laissez-faire enjoyed stronger support under direct British rule and later from 
the predominantly English business class.  





 centuries), racial distinctions crept into the provision of services (Kruger, 1992: 
113). British occupation in the early 19
th
 century brought pre-Victorian English views on the distinction 
between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, and strengthened the racial bias in provision of social 
services, a pattern that remained dominant for almost two centuries.  
The first pension fund, introduced in the old Transvaal (South African) Republic in 1882, was prescribed 
neither by legislation nor by convention and could thus in no way have been regarded as social insurance. 
However, in the 1920s, occupational retirement insurance expanded rapidly to many skilled (mainly white) 
employees. The norm of excluding the lower skilled (and, in the context of apartheid, therefore almost all 
blacks) from such coverage remained, though. Only in the 1960s and the early 1970s, when rapid 
industrialisation increasingly drew African workers into industry, was occupational retirement insurance 
widened to also include less skilled workers. The (mainly) white trade unions were instrumental both in this 
and in having coverage extended to more industries. Membership of both occupational and private 
retirement funds increased from 923 000 in 1958 to 9 309 000 in 1993 (Smith Committee, 1995: D2.4a), a 
growth rate of almost 7 per cent per annum over three and a half decades (though these figures include 
extensive duplication where many people are members of more than one fund). The membership growth rate 
of 8 per cent in the 1960s and 10 per cent in the 1970s slowed to 3.7 per cent in the 1980s, partly as a result 
of saturation of the market.  
After the African trade union movement became a political force in the 1970s, social security only really 
came to the fore as an issue when the government in 1981 attempted to enforce preservation of pension 
rights when people changed jobs – an issue that the trade unions ironically effectively mobilised against, and 
their victory became another milestone in the empowerment of African workers. African workers saw the 
Louw Committee’s recommendation for compulsory preservation of pension rights upon withdrawal from a 
fund  as an attempt to deny them access to their own money (Mouton Committee, 1992:153; Rumney, 
1988:35). Moreover, according to Adler (1989:20), “most Black people see the State as the legitimate source of 
old-age pensions”. Thus this measure met with such fierce resistance that the government was forced to 
withdraw the proposed bill. After this victory, trade unions took a far more active interest in retirement 
benefits. As low income workers who retire often prefer a lump sum benefit to buy land, cattle or a house 
(Basson, 1987:34), partly because the means test favours holding certain assets rather than receiving income 
(Mouton Committee, 1992: 154; Sephton et al., 1990: 45, 101), many provident rather than pensions funds 
were subsequently established. (Retiring pension fund members can receive at most one-third of their benefits 
as a lump sum pay-out and must take the rest as a monthly pension. Provident fund members, however, may 
take their full benefit as a lump sum.)  
                                                                 
5 In conjunction with universal health care for those who cannot afford private health care. Health is not usually 
regarded as part of social security in South Africa, not even in the case of health insurance, so that this issue will 
not be gone into further here.  







Thus social retirement insurance was initially instituted for whites (who dominated the skilled positions in 
formal employment), but eventually extended to Africans. However, the majority of the African labour force, 
who are either unemployed or in jobs not covered by social retirement insurance, remain outside the security 
net.  
The second pillar of the social security system consists of social assistance , i.e. categorical transfers funded 
from general government revenues6 to certain individuals in the form of social old age pensions, disability 
grants, or child support grants, conditional upon the recipient qualifying in accordance with a means test. 
Social assistance benefits presently still reach far more people than social insurance. Its central feature is 
means-testing, which by its very nature encourages a “poverty trap” and can also in certain circumstances 
lead to perverse incentives.  
Modern social assistance in South Africa mainly dates from the period 1910 to 1933, when many new 
schemes were introduced, although Africans and Indians were initially often excluded from benefits (Kruger, 
1992: 159). The exclusion of Africans was predicated on the “civilised labour” view (see Paper 1 in this 
research project), that people accustomed to modern lifestyles and consumption patterns had greater need of 
social protection than those in rural subsistence agriculture, who were not proletarianised and were thus 
presumed to be better placed to meet traditional subsistence needs: 
Rural natives were excluded from old-age pensions mainly on the assumption that Native custom 
makes provision for maintaining dependent persons. Urban Natives were excluded in consequence, 
regardless of their needs, owing ‘to the difficulty of applying any statutory distinction between them 
and other Natives’ (SA, Social Security Committee, 1944: 19, as quoted by Kruger, 1992: 165). 
Military pensions date from 1919, and in 1928 social pensions were instituted for those whites and 
coloureds not covered by occupational retirement insurance, subject to age criteria and a means test to 
ensure that only the needy were targeted. The white population dependent on social pensions remained 
relatively small despite an increasingly liberal means test, as occupational retirement insurance covered the 
more affluent. In 1943, take-up rates amongst the elderly were 40 per cent for whites and 56 per cent for 
coloureds (SA, Social Security Committee, 1944: 43-4, 58). By that year, only 4 per cent of all social assistance 
spending was on Africans (mainly targeted relief and pensions for the blind), 1 per cent for Indians and 16 per 
cent for coloureds (SA, Social Security Committee, 1944: p.15). But in 1944 the Smuts government extended 
social old-age pensions to Africans (Van der Merwe, 1996: 378), though benefit levels were less than one 
tenth of those of whites and the means test far more stringent. By 1958, Africans already composed 60 per 
cent of 347 000 social old-age pensioners, although they received only 19 per cent of old-age pension 
spending. By 1978, after their numbers had grown by 5 per cent a year for two decades, Africans made up 70 
per cent of the 770 000 pensioners and received 43 per cent of pensions. By 1990 this latter proportion had 
increased to 67 per cent.  
Around the time of the Second World War, other forms of social assistance also expanded. In 1936 and 
1937, grants for respectively the blind and the disabled were instituted, but these were initially confined to 
whites and coloureds and only extended to other groups in 1946. War veterans pensions were instituted in 
1941, and family allowances for large low income families in 1947, but these excluded African people 
(Kruger, 1992: 167-170).  
Since the mid-1970s, attempts to give the homeland system and later the three-chamber parliament 
political legitimacy led to a rapid increase in the funds for social assistance, especially for the elderly. Both the 
coverage of the African elderly population and the real value of the benefits paid increased markedly, and in 
                                                                 
6 Under apartheid a large number of administrations were created (10 homelands, 4 provincial administrations 
that covered blacks outside the homelands, and a separate administration under the three-chamber parliament 
for each of the other three groups), each of which had some leeway to set rules and administrative procedures; 
however, funding levels were essentially determined by the white central government. The major way in which 
the homelands deviated from the practice set in South Africa was by not implementing certain types of grants at 
all, or by reducing real benefit levels. 








1993 there were almost twice as many Africans pensioners inside the homelands as outside. The flow of 
funds to the coloured and Indian communities also increased remarkably, but the fiscal costs of incorporating 
these relatively small groups into the mainstream social security system were manageable. The far greater 
fiscal challenge only came later, once the principle of moving to parity in social spending levels was 
reluctantly accepted in the late 1970s.7 From that time onwards, fiscal expenditures on social assistance rose 
rapidly to incorporate blacks into the system and to eliminate the racial barriers which had allowed the white 
welfare state to prosper in the first place. This led to the rise in social old-age pensions spending from 0.59 per 
cent of GDP in 1970 (a decline from the 0.80 per cent in 1960) to 1.82 per cent by 1993 (Smith Committee, 
1995: D2.15) and a budgeted 2.51 per cent in 1998/99 (calculated from South Africa, 1998b: 25, Table 1).  
The levels and types of social grants were then a result of the peculiar nature of political patronage in 
apartheid society, and later attempts to deracialise benefit structures. Fiscal constraints precluded increasing 
black benefits to white levels, thus pension equalisation occurred through a combination of enhancing African 
pension benefits (by 7.3 per cent per year in real terms from 1970 to 1993) and rapidly eroding real white 
pensions (white resistance was limited due to the marginal political position of those small numbers of elderly 
or disabled poor whites who qualified under the means test). In 1980, white pensions displaced more than 30 
per cent of the average wage, compared to only 8.6 per cent for African pensions; by 1993, when pension 
parity was achieved and discrimination in the application of the means tests eliminated, the pension displaced 
15.5 per cent of the average wage (Van der Berg, 1994).  
Under apartheid, white employment was secure (given preferential access to human capital development 
and to some jobs) and most social security needs could be met through social insurance. The major additional 
social security measures required were social grants for the elderly and for the disabled, and child and parent 
allowances. Social assistance was thus set up as a safety net for the white (relatively) poor who, in the wider 
South African context, were not the poorest. In contrast, the safety net for other groups was initially 
rudimentary or non-existent, but as apartheid became diluted through the decades, benefits were gradually 
extended to other race groups and benefit levels were unified. Some of that growth was generated by the 
creation of the homelands and the three-chamber parliament, some by the belated attempt to redesign social 
assistance schemes to be non-racial:  
(t)he social pensions and grants which were set up to protect the white population have gradually 
expanded their eligibility rules to include all South Africans. This makes it ... an unusually 
comprehensive system compared with that found in other developing countries... (Lund, 1993:22). 
By this quirk of history, the social security system changed dramatically in terms of the relative size of the 
two components, with the formerly less important social grants becoming the major part of the social security 
system, reaching far more people than occupational insurance.  
The South African social security system uses primarily social insurance to protect those in formal 
employment, while social assistance (also called social grants or social transfers) is meant to protect those 
poor left unprotected by social insurance. In addition, private provision against certain contingencies is both 
encouraged and common in certain areas (e.g. retirement and life insurance). This next section thus deals with 
social insurance, and the subsequent section with social grants. 
 
3.2 Social insurance 
The large insurance industry plays a crucial role in mobilising contractual savings for investment, much of it as 
occupational retirement insurance. Assets of retirement funds alone amounted to 73 per cent of GDP in 1993 
(Smith Committee, 1995: D2.16). Occupational pensions are mainly responsible that the elderly are on 
average somewhat better off than the working age population (Mouton Committee, 1992:62). In 1992, total 
benefits of R17.2 billion were paid out by occupational retirement funds, of which R3.3 were resignation and 
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withdrawal benefits, leaving retirement benefits of R13.9 billion, compared to the R4.8 billion paid as social 
old-age pensions (Smith Committee, 1995: D2.1, 2.2 & 2.6). 
Aided by agreements between employers and employees, occupational retirement has expanded its 
coverage to most industries. It is usually mandatory for employees in such industries or firms to join their 
Pension or Provident Fund. Coverage is still low in agriculture; trade, catering and accommodation (mainly 
employees of small traders and shopkeepers); and domestic service. Coverage amongst men is probably 
much higher than amongst women, who are disproportionately present in services, including both trade and 
domestic service. Insofar as agreements and convention have made occupational insurance for retirement the 
norm in the formal sector, occupational insurance can be regarded as social insurance, despite the absence of 
legal compulsion to provide such insurance. However, as the “taxes” imposed on employers and employees 
do not flow through state coffers, fiscal comparisons understate social security provision in South Africa. But 
although coverage of the formally employed by occupational pensions schemes for retirement, even after 
allowing for some double counting, is high at about 73 per cent (Mouton Committee, 1992:490, Smith 
Committee, 1995: D2.11), the large extent of unemployment means that only some 40 per cent of the labour 
force is covered (Kruger, 1992: 215, Smith Committee, 1995: D.2.11). According to the Smith Committee 
(1995: D2.8), retirement fund benefits were paid to only 44.5 per cent of the elderly in 1993, as against 78.7 
per cent receiving social old-age pensions.  
Workers and employers typically each contribute 7½ per cent of the monthly wage to a retirement fund. 
Workers can then claim benefits upon retirement. The Pension Funds Act of 1956 lays down the rules for the 
16 000 retirement funds so as to safeguard the interests of their members (Sephton et al., 1990:1). Retirement 
funds also provide withdrawal benefits to employees who resign or are dismissed, retrenchment benefits, and 
sometimes insured benefits to employees who are disabled or to the dependants of employees who die 
(Sephton et al., 1990). Benefits are generally not portable, i.e. they cannot be transferred from one fund to 
another. Consequently, most workers who change jobs get a certain share of the accumulated benefits paid 
out to them and do not transfer retirement benefits to their new employer’s fund. It has been estimated that 
90 per cent of pension fund members are expected to change jobs before retirement (Munro, 1991).  
Typically, an African worker outside the primary sectors accumulates a retirement income of about R40 
per month (2 per cent of final salary) for every year that he belongs to a retirement fund, thus he would need 
to work 13 years to accumulate retirement benefits greater than the full social pension. If he changes jobs and 
withdraws from the fund after 10 years, he thus forfeits R400 retirement pension per month, which is less than 
the social pension of R500 per month. Moreover, upon withdrawal he gets at least his own accumulated 
contribution and some interest back. Furthermore, the social pension, unlike the occupational pension, can be 
expected to roughly keep pace with inflation.  
Occupational retirement insurance is vital for many South Africans, but cannot cater to those outside paid 
employment, nor for some parts of the employed population presently uncovered. Of particular concern is 
that the interaction with the means test for social old-age pensions could discourage private retirement 
provision for many low-income workers, an issue we shall return to.  
Unemployment insurance only applies for certain workers covered by the Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF). Agricultural and domestic workers, certain public sector employees, seasonal workers and those whose 
incomes exceed a certain level are excluded (Kruger, 1992:198). Until the late 1970s, the UIF usually did not 
cover African workers (Mouton Committee, 1992:153-4). In 1993, legislation was enacted to extend 
coverage to agricultural workers.  
Workers and their employers each contribute 1 per cent of the wage to the UIF, which is publicly 
administered and to which the government also from time to time commits funds. When unemployed or ill, 
UIF benefits of 45 per cent of the weekly wage are paid for one week for every six weeks the worker 
contributed, but not exceeding 26 weeks. Maternity benefits and benefits to the dependants of deceased 
workers are of a similar magnitude, although the former was a major contentious issue in the recent debate 
about the Basic Conditions of Employment Bill . Such benefits can thus be at best a way of sheltering the 








presently unemployed against temporary job loss. In 1993, 6.3 million workers were covered, up from 1.7 
million in 1970, a growth rate of 5.9 per cent for more than two decades. But despite its rapid growth, UIF 
coverage was still less than half of the labour force. In 1990 the average payment per unemployed beneficiary 
amounted to only R1 270 per annum. The unemployed beneficiaries from the UIF stood at about 538 000 in 
1991 (Mouton Committee, 1992: 513, D3.5), i.e. only about 6 per cent of those without formal jobs. Benefits 
paid of R1.6 billion in 1994 were 0.5 per cent of total remuneration (Van der Merwe, 1996: 386-8).  
The UIF’s financial position has been seriously eroded by large scale retrenchments in the past decade. 
This makes it difficult to improve the level of benefits it offers. Until the labour surplus situation in South Africa 
has effectively been overcome (which could take decades), unemployment insurance can only cover a small 
part of the labour force for a short period against the scourge of unemployment.  
Worker’s Compensation, instituted in 1941, requires employers to make risk-related contributions to the 
Accident Funds (Kruger, 1992:198), and is paid to employed workers below a threshold income who are 
temporarily or permanently disabled as a result of injuries or industrial diseases sustained at work. In this case 
also, growth of coverage was fairly rapid, from 3.9 million in 1971 to 5.2 million in 1988 (South African 
Statistics, 1992:6.8). In 1988 a total of R320 million was paid from the Fund. There was some concern that the 
criteria for such compensation were sometimes too strictly applied, which disqualified some from getting 
these benefits and sometimes made them an effective burden on the state, if they had to draw disability 
pensions. Mineworkers fell under separate legislation (the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act), 
which in addition to occupational injuries covered them against certain occupational diseases, mainly 
respiratory, prevalent in the industry (Lund, 1993:8). Beneficiaries received lump sum payments rather than 
pensions. It is estimated that coverage had improved to 5,2 million people by 1990. In 1994 new legislation 
was introduced, the Compensation for Industrial Injuries and Diseases Act, replacing both previous Acts and 
providing much improved coverage and removing racial discrimination. Benefits relate to medical aid, 
compensation for temporary disability, and lump sum payments or pensions for permanent disability. A fuller 
treatment of this topic is given by Lund (1994).  
Health insurance is similarly common amongst better-paid workers in the private sector. Others fall back 
on subsidised public health services, usually means tested to ensure that subsidies target the poor. While 
these funds have recently increased their coverage of lower income workers, cost containment problems 
arising inter alia from the usual moral hazard problems associated with such insurance have slowed down this 
expansion, despite concerns about the quality of public health services.  
 
3.3 Social assistance 
Table 4 summarises available information on the various social pensions and allowances for the last years for 
which racially based data were still provided (all the homelands included). The numerically most important 
social transfers are social old-age pensions, covering about three-fifths of all recipients or some one and a half 
million people, followed by disability pensions (another fifth) and child maintenance grants. Other categories 
are much smaller. Although this effectively targets many of the poor (Ardington & Lund, 1995; Case & 
Deaton, 1996), not all the poor can be reached in this way. The Table also shows that by that time coloureds 
and Indians benefited more in per capita terms from social assistance transfers than whites, who have larger 
incomes and thus less frequently qualify.  
 







Table 4: Social pensions and grants paid by category and race, 1990 & 1993 
 White Coloured Indian African Total 
Number of grants (thousands) (1993): 
Old-age 122.9 129.6 34.3 1227.1 1513.6 
War veterans 8.9 4.8 0.1 3.7 17.5 
Disability 38.8 102.5 22.8 335.1 499.2 
Blind 0.8 1.6 0.4 16.0 18.7 
Special care  0.0 0 0.1 2.0 2.1 
Parent allowances 9.6 64.2 14.9 29.4 118.2 
Child maintenance  25.7 167.0 26.6 92.4 311.7 
Foster parent  5.9 22.9 2.0 16.8 47.6 
Single parent  3.2 0.8 0 0.0 4.0 
Total 215.5 493.3 101.3 1722.5 2532.7 
Value of grants (R’million) (1990): 
Old-age (incl. war veterans) 490.8 289.9 69.0 1753.1 2602.8 
Disability (incl. blind) 115.6 201.2 51.6 459.4 827.8 
Family (incl. child grants) 103.6 210.5 55.0 46.4 415.5 
Relief 7.8 23.2 1.3 5.8 38.1 
Total  717.8 724.8 176.9 2 264.7 3 884.2 
Population (‘000s) 5 068 3 286 987 28 780 38 121 
Per capita spending R142 R221 R179 R79 R102 
Proportion of income 0.8% 6.6% 3.0% 5.3% 2.5% 
Source: Calculated from figures obtained from Department of National Health and Population Development and from Lund, F.J. 
1993. State social benefits in South Africa. International Social Security Review 46(1): 9, Table 1 and accompanying text. For the 
TBVC-homelands equal numbers of recipients were assumed pro rata as in the other homelands.  
 
Table 5  shows more recent data on the distribution of social security spending across different social 
assistance programs and the administration of social security. It is evident that old-age pensions still dominate, 
though it has declined somewhat as a proportion of the total. Disability grants, in contrast, have grown from 
22 to 26 per cent of total spending on social assistance. Interesting is also the still low cost of administering 
social assistance, although it has grown in relative terms in an effort to combat inefficiency in delivery and 
fraud in the system.   
 
Table 5: Composition of social assistance expenditure by field of service 
 Expenditure  Percentage of total 
 1995/96 
Actual (R’000) 




growth over period 
Administration     32 470   502 747 0.3% 3.0% 149.2% 
Child and family care 1 427 736 1 888 962 11.6% 11.2% 9.8% 
Old-age pensions * 8 138 280 9 969 551 66.1% 59.3% 7.0% 
Disability grants** 2 699 979 4 371 537 21.9% 26.0% 17.4% 
Relief      12 354      67 399 0.1% 0.4% 76.0% 
Total Social Security  12 310 819  16 800 196 100% 100% 10.9% 
* Including war veterans grants 
** Including pensions for the blind 
Source: South Africa 1998b, 29, Table 5 
 








Table 6 shows data on the social security budget by province. There are wide differences in per capita 
allocations to different provinces, but these result not so much from inequity in allocations, but rather from 
differences in demographic structure and take-up rates in different provinces, the latter partly determined by 
the means test and historical factors. Thus the richest province, Gauteng, has the lowest spending per capita 
on social transfers due to a smaller proportion of its elderly population qualifying under the means test for 
social old-age pensions. High take-up rates of especially the old child and family grants that are now being 
replaced by the new child support grants have kept social assistance spending in the Northern Cape 
inordinately high. Unfortunately, spending on disability grants is rather difficult to express relative to the target 
population, as the numbers of disabled are very uncertain.  
 
Table 6: Budgeted per capita spending by province, 1998/99 
 
 All social assistance 
spending per capita 
Child, family care 
spending per child 
Old-age pensions per 
elderly person 
Eastern Cape R596 R124 R6 945 
Free State R413 R233 R4 178 
North West R387 R 46 R5 984 
Northern Province R386 R118 R4 784 
Mpumalanga R357 R100 R5 631 
Northern Cape R651 R358 R6 051 
Kwazulu/ Natal R470 R153 R5 597 
Western Cape R444 R220 R3 275 
Gauteng R254 R 72 R2 815 
Total R422 R133 R4 826 
Source: South Africa 1998b, 32, Table 10 
 
Social old-age pensions are paid to men from 65 years of age and to women from age 60. Below the lower 
threshold (60 per cent of annual benefit), applicants qualify for the full pension. Above this level, every R2 
increase in pre-pension income reduces the benefit by R1 until the benefit is zero. For married applicants, only 
half the combined income of the applicant and spouse is taken into consideration. The marginal “tax” rate or 
clawback of 50 per cent creates a typical poverty trap and has severe implications for behaviour of low 
income workers, as referred to earlier. The absence of adequate occupational retirement insurance in the past 
has left most people of pensionable age few other income sources than social old-age pensions to fall back 
on. Interestingly, social old age pensions are paid to more than three-quarters of all people of pensionable 
age, thus the means test is largely a way of excluding the rich rather than targeting the poor.  
Disability grants are the second most important form of social assistance. The state provides disability 
grants to the disabled (including the blind) from age 16 up to retirement age, subject to medical eligibility 
criteria and the same means test as for old-age pensions. In 1993 disability grants went to 13 out of every 
thousand South Africans: only to 8 per thousand whites and 12 per thousand Africans, but the figures for 
coloureds (31) and Indians (23) were extremely high and may indicate some abuse of the system, particularly 
in the apartheid dispensation where different administrations applied eligibility rules differently. Considering 
the extent of unemployment, take-up of such benefits will be as great as administrative leniency allows.  
Child maintenance benefits actually comprised of two types of grants: parent allowances and child 
allowances. It was paid mainly to single mothers (including widows, divorcees, women abandoned by their 
spouses, and those never married) and their children who had no other means of support. In the past, it was 
largely not extended to Africans. When the social assistance system was recently deracialised, it became 
apparent that the cost of these grants could become astronomical, that there were potentially perverse 
incentive effects associated with them, and that other equally poor children in intact families may not have 
qualified for such support. Thus following the Lund Committee recommendations, the cabinet approved the 







phasing out of the old child and parent allowances, the institution of a new flat rate child grant of R100 per 
month to caregivers of the poorest children under 7 years of age, and a means test aimed at identifying the 30 
per cent of children in this age group who are most vulnerable. This should add to the flow of social transfers 
into poor communities, and reach particularly households in the bottom two quintiles of the income 
distribution. If one considers the mean annual household income in the quintile of R2 406 in 1993, annual 
flows of R1 200 or R2 400 to recipient households (assuming either one or two children in the relevant age 
category) may have a considerable impact, even allowing for inflation. Overall spending allocated for this 
purpose of R2.7 billion per annum once it is fully operational, however, constitutes little more than 10 per 
cent of the income of the bottom two quintiles. Moreover, even under optimistic circumstances there would 
be some leakage to the non-poor, and some of the present R1.3 billion spent on the old grants also reaches 
the poorest. Thus such a programme, though important, would not have nearly the same impact as an 
acceleration in employment would have on the conditions of the poor. 
 
3.4 Coverage against risk: The adequacy of social security 
To understand the impact of the South African social security system, it is useful to consider how people in 
different income classes with diverging educational and skill levels are reached. Ideally, such an analysis 
should consider education, employment, wages, income, living standards, life cycles and contingencies, 
uncovered risks, and opportunities for class mobility through education, rural-urban migration or marriage.  
Table 7: Socio-economic situation of different income classes, 1993
*
 




Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5: 
Richest 
 
Per capita income R390 R1 056 R1 974  R4 158 R20 478 R5 611 




R287 R546 R930 R1 611 R4 689 R1 598 
Unemployed 53% 43% 30% 17% 4% 30% 
No education 24% 18% 13% 7% 6% 15% 
Less than full primary educ. 54% 42% 33% 21% 9% 35% 
Completed secondary educ. 4% 8% 13% 23% 62% 19% 
Completed tertiary education 0% 0% 0.2% 0.6% 10.3% 1.8% 
Primary enrolment (net) 85% 87% 88% 89% 90% 87% 
Secondary enrolment (net) 46% 57% 67% 78% 83% 60% 
Tertiary enrolment (net) 4% 5% 8% 20% 38% 11% 
Remittances / Income  27% 14% 6% 2% 1% 3% 
Regular wage/ Income 23% 44% 67% 79% 65% 65% 
Regular wage main income source 
(% of households) 
19% 41% 65% 84% 84% 59% 
Households rural 76% 68% 46% 33% 15% 47% 
Households metropolitan 10% 14% 29% 40% 58% 30% 
Households in other urban areas 14% 18% 25% 27% 27% 23% 
Households African 96% 93% 82% 68% 25% 73% 
Households white 1% 1% 3% 16% 66% 17% 
Household size 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.4 4.2 5.5 
Persons per room 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.5 1.4 














H’holds with electricity 15% 28% 49% 77% 98% 53% 








Commute by car/motorbike 7% 7% 10% 26% 77% 30% 
Treated by private doctor 23% 31% 41% 53% 73% 44% 
Stunting of children under 5 38% 27% 23% 18% 6% 27% 
Satisfied with quality of life 17% 22% 29% 39% 70% 35% 
Govt. food aid a major issue 34% 27% 17% 14% 11% 20% 
* 
Figures not fully comparable across dimensions, as criteria for division into quintiles differed (e.g. income/ consumption group, 
quintile of households/individuals, etc.) 
**
 Including casual labour
 
Sources: Compiled from: World Bank. 1995. Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa. Prepared for RDP Office. Pretoria: 
Government Printer; Saldru. 1994. South Africans Rich and Poor: Baseline Household Statistics, Cape Town: Saldru; Janisch, C.A. 
1996. An analysis of the burdens and benefits of taxes and government expenditure in the South African economy for the year 
1993/94. Masters dissertation. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal; Klasen, S. 1996. Poverty and inequality in South Africa. Mimeo. 
Cambridge: Centre for History and Economics, King’s College 
 
For convenience, we identify four income class types, which we shall call, not fully accurately,  
?  the affluent (largely Quintile 5) 
?  the stable urban working class (Quintile 4) 
?  the insecure formal sector (Quintile 3) 
?  outsiders (Quintiles 1 and 2, the poor) 
 
Despite its many limitations, such a typology is useful for focusing on the contingencies that interest us. 
 
i) The affluent (Quintile 5): Under apartheid, the affluent have long been mainly white, but in the past two 
decades their ranks have been joined by members of other race groups. By 1993, only about two-thirds of the 
richest income quintile were white, and by  1995 whites may even have declined to only about half of 
households in this class (South Africa, 1997: Figure 36). This group exhibits high levels of education and wage 
and per capita income levels three times the national average. Moreover, almost all children enrol for 
secondary education and a substantial proportion goes on to tertiary education, thus this income class 
reproduces itself. Lifestyles reflect the suburban nature of this group (though perhaps less so amongst recent 
African converts to their ranks): spacious homes (two rooms per person, on average), universal access to 
electricity, commuting to work by private means, and general satisfaction with their quality of life.  
Contingencies amongst such a group approximate those in industrial societies, and most risks are well 
covered by occupational insurance (or private insurance for self-employed professionals). Although coverage 
against cyclical unemployment is weak (the upper income groups are excluded from compulsory 
unemployment insurance), they are least affected by cyclical downswings and their skills and education limit 
the risk of long term structural unemployment.  
ii) Stable urban working class (Quintile 4): In this largely urban income class, Africans already dominate in 
numerical terms, but Indians and coloureds are disproportionately represented, while lower middle class to 
working class whites typically also fall into this category. The striking feature of this group is their access to 
relatively well paid urban employment; unemployment occurs mainly amongst women or other secondary 
earners. This group is characterised by above average educational levels (though appreciably less than that of 
the affluent), but more particularly by high levels of enrolment of children in secondary and tertiary education: 
this is an upwardly mobile group.  
This group faces some risk of falling victim to unemployment because of lower education and skill levels, 
which may pull them down the income distribution ladder once unemployment insurance benefits have been 
exhausted. Younger members of this group are accumulating adequate occupational insurance benefits 
before retirement to be potentially independent of the social old-age pension, but this group is most affected 







by rules relating to the withdrawal of benefits when they change jobs and by the means test for old-age 
pensions. Though coverage is for many of them still of recent origin, this group looks mainly to occupational 
insurance rather than to social assistance for their social security.  
iii) The insecure formal sector (Quintile 3): This group is most mixed in terms of employment status and 
geographic origin. Where the affluent are clearly urban and engaged in long term formal jobs, this group 
includes many better paid farm workers and a large proportion of migrant “men of two worlds”, who may 
have families and assets in rural areas but who are economically dependent on urban areas. Their access to 
jobs, however, is tenuous, as they usually have limited skills and low educational levels. As a result, many live 
in crowded housing or squatter shacks in the cities, while housing for farm workers is only as secure as their 
jobs.  
High risks of unemployment subject many in this group to fluctuating fortunes, that depend on cyclical 
factors and uncertain prospects of finding new employment. When the duration of unemployment is 
appreciable and households have no other employed earner, many slip down the income ladder. On the 
other hand, those with some skills and education who do obtain regular employment may graduate to the 
second quintile. Life cycle factors may be particularly important for this group; youths who do find 
employment could add dramatically to the household’s fortunes.  
Social insurance has a limited role amongst this group, although many of them are nominally covered by it. 
They prefer provident rather than pension funds for occupational retirement provision, as taking lump sum 
retirement benefits may still allow them to qualify under the means test for the full social old-age pension. If 
they are disabled (and physical disabilities are common in this group and amongst the outsiders), workmen’s 
compensation helps those injured on the job, while disability grants or social pensions are generous enough 
to maintain smaller households in this income class.  
iv) Outsiders (Quintiles 1 and 2, the poor): This group consists predominantly of rural Africans who are 
poorly educated (78 per cent of household heads in the bottom quintile have not even completed primary 
education (World Bank, 1995:27)). In this poorest group, social stress is evident in high rates of absenteeism 
from rural areas of able-bodied males who work in the cities. Extremely high unemployment rates plus low 
wages - often in casual jobs – result in less than one in four of these households having a regular wage as 
main source of income. A permanent job or a social pension may sometimes move such households up the 
income ladder, but that partly depends on the burden of dependants. Household size is typically large, 
despite the absence of many workers from rural areas, whose remittances are a crucial but often very 
uncertain source of income (remittances contribute more than a regular wage to household incomes). Such 
broken households are also one of the factors that account for the higher proportion of women than men in 
poverty (World Bank, 1995: 13). The poor nutritional status of children is shown by stunting rates of one in 
three children under five, as against only 6 per cent amongst the affluent. Small wonder this group places a 
high premium on government food aid and is extremely dissatisfied with their quality of life.  
Social assistance is vital for this group. For one in four, social assistance is the main source of income, 
compared to only 5 per cent amongst other households (World Bank, 1995: 15). Without such flows of funds 
to pensioners and the disabled, the nutritional and social situation of the beneficiaries and their extended 
families would have been much worse. It has been convincingly shown that such social transfers reach 
communities who have otherwise been poorly provided with social services such as education or health 
(Ardington & Lund, 1995; Case & Deaton, 1996). 
 
3.5 Social security policy 
The challenge for South Africa is to offer a safety net for the poor, who are still numerous mainly due to the 
absence of remunerated employment, while insuring those in employment against major contingencies (loss 
of employment, old-age, ill health, disability). It has been shown in an earlier paper in this research project that 








social transfers contribute more towards reducing poverty than to increasing incomes, an indication that 
indeed they are relatively well targeted. But although the social security system is relatively well-targeted and 
has developed to almost unprecedented levels for a semi-industrial country, the previous section showed that 
there are still major gaps. But the resources devoted from state general revenue to social security (as opposed 
to enforced social security taxes) are already generous and competing demands on fiscal resources at a time 
of political transition leave little scope for additional resources for social security.  
Another growing problem is the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which is likely to have a major impact on the welfare 
of many South Africans. Not only the number of projected deaths is worrying, but also the many orphans and 
the wider impact this is likely to have on social support structures. In this respect the demand for social 
security may grow sharply.   
The major contingency against which no proper protection is given, is unemployment, which has been 
extensively discussed in other parts of this research project and is strongly linked to poverty. Occupational 
insurance can reach at best only half the labour force, leaving the most vulnerable dependent upon various 
forms of social assistance. As living standards largely depend on access to remunerative employment, their 
poor education and skills imply that the rural African population is worst affected.   
A second major deficiency of the social security system is that its impact on the poorest – those 
uncovered by social insurance - is almost exclusively tied to the presence of elderly or disabled members in 
households. There is naturally a life cycle component to it, as families may materially benefit at different stages 
from such a presence. However, at any particular time there are many poor families without such support. 
Social assistance for the elderly is a necessary, but insufficient condition for reaching most poor households. 
Social old-age pensions may have affected family structures by encouraging poor families to retain older 
members in the household, thus enhancing the status of old people in rural society and making them the main 
“breadwinners” in many extended families (cf. Case & Deaton, 1996: 11). Those households without access 
to employment and with no elderly or disabled members have become the poorest. Thus many children and 
young families are especially vulnerable, as are older workers who cannot effectively compete for manual 
work but are yet too young to qualify for pensions. If the prevention or amelioration of poverty is one of the 
major roles of the social security net, there is still considerable need for targeting such households.  
The options in this regard are limited, given the large resource transfers required and the potential perverse 
incentive effects associated with certain possible targeting devices. For instance, substantial social transfers 
targeted at the unemployed may have perverse impacts on job search, labour input or even educational 
attendance. One possible approach is low wage public employment schemes as a self-targeting mechanism in 
rural areas, but efforts to this end have run into union opposition, capacity constraints and limited enthusiasm 
in government, inter alia because of the lack of a “powerful interest group to fight for the programme” (Breslin 
et al., 1997: 34) One major reason for this is the persisting view that social transfers are handouts and 
therefore to be avoided. It is thus unclear what measures could or would be taken in this regard, though 
improvements to the unemployment insurance for those in employment are almost certain to ensue in the 
next few years and would improve the situation of those who lose their jobs. They are, however, a small 
proportion of the unemployed. Of more importance is an expansion of providing low-wage programmes that 
could reach large segments of the very poor. International experience has shown that it is essential that such 
programmes should offer relatively low wages, in order to attract only the poorest and not those already 
engaged in productive activities in the informal sector.  
A continuing concern regarding is the interaction between social insurance and social assistance, 
especially for retirement provision. The crucial issue is how the means test interacts with occupational or 
private insurance and with the tax system. As more and more cohorts of Africans who retire have 
accumulated some occupational pension claims, the operation of the means test becomes more difficult. 
Improved targeting may seem one option, but does not reduce the negative aspects of the means test, i.e. the 
poverty trap and associated perverse incentive effects on saving behaviour, the propensity to lie about private 
income, and the difficulty of administration. The National Consultative Retirement Forum, set up by the 
government in 1997, expressed some support for a universal grant for the elderly, though cognisance was 







taken of the fiscal constraints. A universal grant would remove the perverse incentives flowing from the 
present means test for withdrawal of retirement benefits, private retirement insurance for informal sector 
participants and domestic servants, the choice between lump sum retirement benefits and pensions, and the 
form in which assets are held. Abolishing the means test should encourage private retirement provision. 
Moreover, the means test encourages dishonesty and withholding of information and is difficult to administer. 
It would become even more difficult to apply when more people who retire receive some occupational 
retirement benefits.  
The fiscal consequences of a universal old-age grant could partly be reduced by clawing back some 
spending through higher income tax, both by removing the old-age rebate and by the normal operation of the 
income tax scales. Thus net fiscal costs may appear manageable. However, more rapid ageing of the South 
African population means that the numbers in the higher age categories are presently growing more rapidly 
than the aggregate population and, indeed, as rapidly as the economy. Thus just to maintain real benefit 
levels, fiscal expenditures for old-age pensions would have to grow as rapidly as the economy. Unless 
economic growth accelerates markedly, such a universal grant is fiscally unrealistic. This point is strengthened 
by the fact that the tax system – which is supposed to claw back some of the cost – is still operating 
ineffectively and is being confronted by rapid expansion of potential numbers in the income tax paying 
brackets.  
As long as the lurking menace of unemployment remains, the outsiders in South African society cannot be 
fully drawn into the economic and social mainstream, neither by social security nor by other means. Social 
assistance programmes can at best alleviate the plight of the rural poor, in itself an important enough 
objective. But for the moment, improved benefit levels for existing programmes are also unlikely, for that is 
not now the main priority. Employment is all that will allow social security needs to be contained to levels 
commensurate with the fiscal ability of the economy. Only then will South Africa be able to make further 
progress on the road to an advanced social security system.  
The major gap in income security thus remains the large scale unemployment that so plagues South Africa. 
An extension of the Unemployment insurance system offers little hope, for this cannot reach those who have 
never been employed. A more promising avenue is the provision of low-wage public works programmes. 
These have the benefit of self-targeting: only the really poor are willing to work at very low wages. Attempts to 
expand such programmes in South Africa have thus far come up against opposition from trade unions, either 
because of the low wages, or because they see such programmes as undercutting unionised work. Within 
government, too, there has been little acceptance of such programmes as low-wage income support schemes 
rather than permanent job-creation or training schemes. Moreover, fiscal costs and managerial capacity within 
government are further constraints on massive expansion of such programmes, so that it appears that a 
moderate growth over time is the most that can be expected at this stage. The impact on the poor is thus 
likely to remain small. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Government’s policies have already shifted substantially towards poverty alleviation, and there is limited 
scope for further initiatives to improve the position of the poor without major additional resource outlays. In 
the policy field, the discussion above suggests three areas for increased government attention in order to 
reduce poverty over the medium to long term, supplementing those policies already in place. These are: 
• improving the quality of education, inter alia through better information systems on cognitive achievement 
levels in education; 
• expanding low-wage public works programmes as a form of self-targeted poverty relief for those who 
cannot get access to jobs; 








• government intervention in the capital market to ensure enhanced access to the poor of capital 
particularly for entrepreneurial purposes (though education would probably also benefit from it). This 
policy area was not discussed within the ambit of the present research project. 
These policies, by themselves, cannot reduce poverty drastically. However, as everywhere in the world, 
South Africa is also likely to experience that sustained long run economic growth is the best alleviator of 
poverty, especially if such growth is employment creating. To some extent, these policy thrusts suggested 
above may contribute to such an outcome, but they also need to be underpinned by viable macroeconomic 
policies that would create the necessary climate for attracting international capital. For this reason the 
government’s macro-economic growth strategy, GEAR, will have to be continued and consolidated. If 
poverty-ameliorating policies such as these suggested above complement a successful growth strategy, 
poverty alleviation may be quite rapid. As in Latin America, where, as discussed in the introduction, the 
turning point in inequality may have been reached, South African racial inequalities are also now being 
reduced in the new political dispensation. If growth is added to the mix, both poverty and racial inequality 
may be strongly reduced, and the trend towards increased inequality within racial groups may be arrested.  
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Literacy and numeracy test scores by age and race, 1993
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African literacy and numeracy test scores and years of 
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